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ATTACHMENTS
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1. Location of the German crude petroleum plants and synthetic oil plants;

A. Synthetic Plants

		Approximate Monthly Capacity in Tons.
1.	Leunawerke (Saxony)	100,000 - 120,000
2.	*Pölitz (near Stettin)	70,000 - 80,000
3.	Brüx (Sudetenland)	60,000
4.	*Scholven (Ruhrgebiet-Westfalen)	80,000
5.	Böhlen " "	40,000
6.	Ruhrchemie " " near Essen	30,000
7.	Gelsenkirchen " "	30,000
8.	Schwarzheide (near Lausitz)	15,000
9.	Lützendorf (Niedersachsen)	15,000
10.	Blechhammer (Silesia)	30,000
11.	*Moosbierbaum (Niederösterrich)	10,000 - 12,000
12.	Various small plants in Rhein and Ruhr area	20,000 - 25,000
		537,000

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* Pölitz, Scholven and Moosbierbaum are principally for aviation gasoline.

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Comment 1. [illegible] informant was ordered from the last [illegible] said that he knew of no plant by that name but he did recollect that a new synthetic plant was under construction in that area. It was to produce 20 to 25,000 tons per month and to be ready in the winter of 1944-45. He did not believe it was in operation at the time he left Germany (August 1944).

B. Refineries

(1) In the Reich

1. Hamburg and vicinity:

a. Shell Refinery ([illegible])	
b. [illegible] Oil Refinery (Deutsche [illegible] Oel A.G.)	
c. Refinery [illegible]	10,000 - 20,000
2. Harburg	
3. [illegible] ([illegible])	10,000
4. [illegible]	10,000
5. [illegible] (Vacuum Oil Comp.)	[illegible]
6. [illegible] ([illegible])	10,000
7. [illegible]	10,000
8. [illegible] ([illegible])	5,000
	[illegible]
	[illegible]

(2) Protectorate, Bohemia, and Moravia

(These refineries were not in operation as of March-April 1944. Whether they are operating now subsource did not know)

1. Kolin (Vacuum Oil Comp.)	10,000 ?
2. Pardubice	?
3. Kralup	5,000
4. 2 or 3 small refineries in [illegible] [illegible]	

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(3) Slovakia

Bratislava (Apollo - I.G. Farben) 20,000

(It was in June and the beginning of July entirely destroyed. It was to be rebuilt not in the city, but outside the city).

(4) Hungary

1. Budapest - Csepel (Shell)
2. Almasfüzitö (Vacuum Oil)
3. Komarom (Honved refinery)
4. 2 or 3 further unimportant refineries ?

All synthetic plants and refineries are well known to the Anglo-American airforces, for all of them have already been attacked but have been always, at least partially, rebuilt.

2. Approximate pre-raid and post-raid (August 1944) rates of output in these plants:

a. The capacity of the plants before attack has already been indicated under paragraph 1. However, even before the attacks, which began in force around April, the total capacity was never entirely utilized.

b. After the attacks, capacity has varied greatly; it changed daily according to the intensity and the effectiveness of the attacks and of the reconstruction work.

c. By the middle of August 1944 the actual output (estimated on a monthly average) reached a total of 200,000 - 250,000 tons.

3. d. Because of extraordinary efforts in rebuilding, it is today probably not less, perhaps even larger, especially since several small distillation plants have been built.

3. Total consumption of petroleum products by Germany during 1944, given as nearly as possible by months, and divided into military consumption, industrial consumption, and civilian consumption:

a. The total requirements of Germany, including occupied territories and the Allied European countries (Italy, Bulgaria), were in May 1944 about 800,000 tons, of which 180,000 tons were aviation gasoline.

b. Requirements for the preceding months of 1944 were probably the same, with the exception of aviation gasoline; for this product requirements were less.

c. Well over half of Germany's requirements were accounted for by the Wehrmacht (including the Navy); the rest for industry. Civilian consumption in general plays no longer any role. With the exception of doctors and some officials, civilians for a long time have not had automobiles at their disposal. Besides, many automobiles have been converted to producer gas (Autarie-Utilone).

Requirements were covered as follows:

Imports from Rumania:	250,000 tons
" " Hungary:	40,000 "
	290,000 tons
The remainder, approx.	510,000
(from German production)	800,000 tons

Already in June a serious deterioration of the requirements situation had set in:

(1) through the attacks on the plants in the Reich
(2) " " " " " " " Rumania

Consumption had to be reduced rapidly. In July, exports from Rumania were only 130,000 tons.

Beginning with August, consumption could not exceed production which was about 200,000 - 250,000 tons (see above), since there were no longer any reserves. The greatest part of the requirements now probably were reserved for the Wehrmacht, so that the industrial sector of economy was even worse off than before.

4. Total reserve of petroleum products available to Germany in 1944:

Petroleum reserves never were higher than 6 months requirements--generally less. From May and June on, reserves declined rapidly. In July it was estimated in Berlin that at the end of August there would be no more reserves at hand, and at that time Rumania had not broken away from Germany. Even Wehrmacht-reserves scarcely existed. How small they were is shown by the fact that for the Wehrmacht in France at the beginning of June (before the invasion) there were only 40,000 tons available as operational reserves.

5. Location of petrole[illegible]

a. The limited available reserves were distributed throughout the Reich in the various small and large tank-depots of all cities, especially in the Danube depots at Vienna and Regensburg (which to Subsource's knowledge have been removed for the most part after the beginning of the attacks).

b. Underground tank-depots of large capacity are few. Subsource knew of the depot in "Vienna-Lobau" and in "Pirkenau". Both depots have already been attacked. As well as Subsource remembered, the depot at Pirkenau was attacked in July by the Anglo-American airforce with special bombs of deep penetration. At that time an underground reservoir with very valuable iso-octance gasoline was damaged, which created great anxiety in Berlin.

c. Informant said that he had heard of an underground oil depot at Unterpfaffenhofen, but knew no details.

6. Location of any special fuel plants (fuel for new weapons, etc.):

a. As stated in paragraph 1, in some plants aviation gasoline principally produced. Scholven was the largest plant for aviation gasoline. It, however, has been heavily damaged. Of special fuel for new weapons Subsource knew nothing. In the winter 1944/45 large quantities of Diesel-oil have to be produced for the new large submarines.

b. About the "several small distillation plants" being built, Subsource said he had been told of them in June 1944 and understood that several were in the Schwarzwald.

c. Informant said it was true that the Germans had been operating some of the Fernius plants on crude oil; and that the results had been "very good". The only plants, however, which he knew definitely to have done this were "Blitz and (on a small scale) Bosbierbaum. As to Bosbierbaum, he said it produced a special iso-octane booster which was mixed with aviation gas produced elsewhere.

7. Estimate of damage so far inflicted by bombing on Germany's oil plants and depots:

a. As indicated in paragraph 1, almost all the plants (synthetic plants as well as refineries) have been attacked, with the result that today Germany cannot cover more than one third of its former requirements, which already had been reduced to the utmost. Although the occupied areas have been lost for the most part and although the front has become shorter, the overall petroleum situation, nevertheless, must be regarded as very critical, if not more than 200,000 tons a month are available.

b. [illegible] it can become complete and absolutely effective is presented in paragraph 10.

2. Estimate of the effect so far made on the efficiency of the Wehrmacht by the bombing of oil plants:

a. The greatest effect on the Wehrmacht was caused by damage to aviation-gasoline production. At the beginning of August, production of aviation gasoline had declined to 20,000 tons as against the reduced requirements of the air force of 140,000 tons per month (the former requirements were as mentioned above: 180,000 tons). To what extent the situation has been ameliorated in the meantime (since the middle of August) Submarine did not know.

b. As a result of the insufficient reserves of petroleum and the loss of a part of the production, military operations in Russia and France have certainly become much more difficult. In the meantime, there have been constructed tanks using gas-oil as well as large submarines which require much more gas-oil than previously. The tight petroleum situation will certainly affect unfavorably the employment of these new weapons.

3. Description of the plans and efforts being made by the Germans to lessen the effects of the oil bombing:

a. The problem of providing petroleum has become the central problem in the Reich. In June, at the Führer's Headquarters, a conference was held presided over by Hitler to discuss this problem. A commissar was appointed (Geilenberg) who received the greatest power ever given to an economist in Germany. The program for the rebuilding of refineries ranks above the fighter program and the U-boat program. All demands for material and labor must be met immediately. It was stated during the above mentioned meeting that the war could be lost if Germany did not succeed in rebuilding the refineries and the synthetic plants. With regard to new construction of refineries this was left out of consideration:

(1) because of the lack of material
(2) because of the lack of time

b. The building of new synthetic plants in particular demands much time and material. (There is an extraordinary lack of material in the Reich. This especially affects the construction of tanks and tank-plants) emphasizing the great importance of the destruction of tanks!). Underground refineries and synthetic plants demand so much work that decision was given against them.

c. In July 1944 very small distillation plants with a monthly capacity of 800-1000 tons (which yield minimal performance and primitive operation) began being set up and when possible hidden in woods (Schwarzwald, etc.). This, however, is only a stop-gap measure.

d. The conversion of automobiles to producer gas (charcoal-burning and butane-butilene) has already been carried as far as possible. This conversion is not possible for the Wehrmacht (for reasons of supply).

e. The principal factor which Germany can go on is the necessity of rebuilding the petroleum plants.

f. As to material shortages affecting reconstruction of oil plants, informant said that the tube position had always been relatively easy, but that good-quality steel plates were short, and "monometers" almost impossible to get.