

*Joint Intelligence Committee - Weekly Summary
#58 - 16 Feb. 1944*

RETURN TO RESEARCH STUDIES INSTITUTE U.S.A.F. HISTORICAL DIVISION ARCHIVES BRANCH	
--	--

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

2-3640-

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

M12352

No 30

Joint Intelligence
Committee

WEEKLY SUMMARY

NUMBER 58

16 February 1944

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11652

RSI Contl No

S 15971

"A brief summary highlighting the military, political, economic and psychological situation. Pronounced trends affecting current operations or pointing toward counter-action are emphasized. Detailed descriptions of military operations, unless conducted under unusual conditions or depicting advance tactics or technique, are avoided."

16 February 1944

Secret

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Fighting along the 30-mile periphery of the Anzio beachhead has been temporarily stabilized. The momentum of the enemy attack declined following his capture on 9 February of Aprilia (Carroceto), a small settlement 9 miles north of Anzio, and the line in that sector now runs near the southern exits of the village.

German resistance along the main battle front between the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Apennine hill mass continued determined and effective, restricting the Allied forces to small gains in and around Cassino and on Mount Cairo to the northwest. Parachute battalions of the First Parachute Division have recently been shifted from the Anzio sector to reinforce the Cassino defenses. Elsewhere on the Tyrrhenian front, the Germans were not subjected to any appreciable Allied pressure. The Adriatic sector continued inactive.

The German forces opposing the Allies in central Italy are organized into two armies—the Fourteenth at the Anzio beachhead and the Tenth on the main battle front to the south—under the over-all command of General Field Marshal Kesselring. The armies together comprise about 18½ divisions. Units equivalent to 7 divisions are facing the Anzio beachhead; the balance are fighting on the main front or are in immediate reserve in that area.

Air Operations Over Italy

Bad weather restricted air operations throughout Italy during the week. Toward the end of the week weather conditions improved and heavy bombers of the Strategic Air Force were employed on two days against enemy positions to the rear of the beachhead area and near Cassino. The

SECRET

German air effort over the beachhead continued on a reduced scale, with the exception of one day on which approximately 100 enemy aircraft were seen. In one of these attacks a U. S. destroyer succeeded in jamming enemy radar-controlled glider bombs which, as a result, fell harmlessly into the sea.

Civil Affairs in Italy

Administrative authority over liberated Italy south of the Salerno-Potenza-Bari line as well as over Sardinia and Sicily was transferred to the Badoglio Government by the Allies on 10 February. The Allies announced that they would require Italian administrative officials to be men of good faith and Allied sympathies, and stipulated that the transfer implied no commitment to the Badoglio Government after the fall of Rome. Allied Military Government officials are to remain as "advisers" to the Badoglio regime, which will continue to operate under the authority of the Allied Control Commission.

The groundwork for a gradual shift of authority from Allied to Italian hands apparently is laid by these changes. They provide a framework within which all Italian parties could gain experience and strength in administrative and political action. The willingness of the Italians to assume responsibility and their ability to handle local problems will probably determine the degree of influence which they will achieve under the arrangement of dual control.

The Italian administration may find its most serious problems in Sicily, where the Separatist movement recently has directed vigorous attacks against Marshal Badoglio. An increasing number of politically conscious Sicilians, according to reliable observers, have given their support to this independence program. The Separatists are backed by large landholders who fear that a liberal and democratic govern-

ment would divide up their estates, and apparently feel that Badoglio might be compelled to yield to pressure for agrarian and other social reforms. Ostensibly the Separatists base their opposition to Badoglio on the traditional Sicilian argument that mainland governments try to exploit the island.

On the mainland, opposition and royalist factions are continuing their efforts to establish a strong political position in anticipation of the impending showdown. The monarchists seem increasingly to feel that their best hopes lie with Crown Prince Humbert rather than with his father, and are reliably reported to be waging their campaign by extra-parliamentary methods. Objections to the Crown Prince appear to be diminishing among the opposition parties, with the exception of the Action Party. This suggests that the major issue between royalists and the opposition will not be the personality of a King but the composition and powers of the projected new government. All of the parties, meanwhile, appear to feel the uncertainty of their position and the impossibility of taking decisive action until Rome is occupied and the views of the Allies are made known.

Air Operations Over Western Europe

Daylight attacks by heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force against targets in Germany and France continued on a heavy scale. Frankfurt, previously the target for two attacks by the Eighth Air Force, was subjected to two further attacks last week and Brunswick, which had also been previously bombed twice by the Eighth Air Force, was hit again. Both of these cities are important centers of production for the aircraft industry.

The attack on Brunswick and the second attack on Frankfurt, both made under relatively favorable weather conditions, provoked extremely heavy enemy fighter opposition. The strong reaction encountered on these missions, in con-

SECRET

trast to the weak opposition met over Germany during the preceding week, suggests that weather conditions, accurate diagnosis of our objectives and the importance of the target are the primary factors in determining the scale of enemy resistance offered against bombing operations over Germany. In the attack on Brunswick, our losses were heavy, largely as a result of a break in the fighter escort, which gave the enemy twin-engine fighters an opportunity to attack our bomber formations. In the second attack on Frankfurt, however, enemy fighters concentrated primarily on the fighter escort and were unable to break through; as a result our bomber losses were exceptionally low. Substantial attrition of enemy fighters was claimed on both of these operations.

On five days of the week, heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force attacked military installations along the coast of France and enemy airdromes farther in the interior, while light, medium and fighter bombers continued their usual operations in this same area. Enemy fighter reaction to these attacks continued generally weak.

The Luftwaffe carried out further reprisal raids against the United Kingdom.

German Preparations in the West

German defensive arrangements along the channel coast, seemingly in preparation for an Allied invasion, have become more noticeable during the past few weeks. A considerable increase in armored forces has been noted in Brittany and in the rear of the Normandy coastline between Cherbourg and the mouth of the Seine. North of the Seine no increase in German armored forces has been reported. German units along the French Mediterranean coastline continue to be few in number and are believed to be of poor quality.

Spanish Policy

Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis in relations between the Allies and Spain have been continuing. In response to

Spanish protests, Allied propaganda, especially British, has been moderated, a shipment of ammonium nitrate to Spain has been authorized, and approval has been given to the loading of one Spanish tanker with crude oil—because it was presumed to be already en route when petroleum shipments were suspended.

For its part, the Spanish Government has given instructions for the immediate but temporary suspension of wolfram exports to all destinations, pending Spain's preparation of counter proposals on the wolfram issue. This temporary embargo is now of special importance since both Germany and the Allies recently resumed all-out competitive purchasing and the United States has placed first priority on the demand for a wolfram embargo or drastic limitation of exports. It is improbable that preclusive purchasing alone would prevent Germany, with her recently acquired peseta exchange, from satisfying her minimum tungsten requirements through imports of Spanish wolfram.

Spain has also released some, but not all, of the Italian merchant ships in Spanish ports and has expressed the intention of withdrawing all Spanish soldiers from the Eastern Front, regardless of their designation. Finally, the Franco government has decided to suppress the German consulate at Tangier, expel German agents from Spanish Morocco, and reduce the number of Nazi operatives in Spain.

It would appear from these developments that the Spanish Government, in spite of its sharp protests against Allied sanctions, is inclined to negotiate its way out of the present situation. With negotiations still in progress, the eventual formula for any of the separate issues between Spain and the Allies cannot be anticipated; it is uncertain that Spain will concede as much as Britain and the United States have demanded. The heavy military resistance currently being offered by the German army in Italy may exert on Spain an

SECRET

influence adverse to the Allies by encouraging Franco's belief in a delayed and compromise peace.

It appears even less certain that the Spanish Government will execute faithfully new undertakings, once made. An instance of obstructive tactics in this respect has occurred in regulation of the passenger traffic on *Iberia* between Spain and North Africa. Despite an agreement with the Allies to permit inspection and control of passenger lists, the air line—on orders from Madrid—has refused to furnish complete lists to the United States consulate at Tangier, thus continuing to make possible the travel of Axis agents to Africa.

Occupied Poland

During the first week of February the Polish Government-in-exile at London announced the formation within Poland of a Council of National Unity. This Council was created to replace the so-called Political Representation, composed of delegates of the four main political parties supporting the Government-in-exile, which served as an advisory council for the Plenipotentiary of the Government, head of the Government Underground. The functions of the new Council will approximate those of the Representation; the chief alterations are in name and in an enlargement of representation from the four political parties.

Communiqués of the Polish Government-in-exile and statements carried in the official *Dziennik Polski* have long emphasized the legally subsisting character of the Government and its substitute administration within occupied Poland. Announcement that the Council had been established was doubtless intended to reinforce the Polish contention that the London Government is prepared to undertake administration in Poland as soon as German forces are expelled. This move of the Government-in-exile therefore has special significance in view of recent Soviet attacks apparently calculated to destroy it.

Contemporaneously with the Polish announcement of the Council of National Unity, a Moscow dispatch reported the formation within Poland of a People's National Council representing "all influential political parties and groups that are actively fighting the German occupation." The report was attributed to the Kosciuszko clandestine transmitter, an organ of the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR. This development had been foreshadowed in continuing reports that a Soviet-sponsored administration would be formed of local underground leaders in Poland. As stated in the Moscow dispatch, the criterion of representation on the People's National Council is resistance to the Germans, as opposed to the legitimist claim which the Government-in-exile takes for its basis. Announcement of the formation of the People's Council comes as another blow against the Government-in-exile in its struggle to continue existence and to press the national claims urged by its members, by exiled Poles, and allegedly by the metropolitan population of Poland.

The Eastern Front

The large-scale Red Army winter offensive continued to be hampered throughout the week by the unusually mild, though changeable weather. Mud and icy ground alternated to prevent full exploitation of the Soviet successes, particularly in the Ukraine. The main Soviet effort continued south of the Pripiet where the bulk of Red Army elite units are concentrated, although more striking progress occurred in the northern half of the front where the Germans continued their orderly withdrawal westward toward their Narva-Lake Peipus-Vitebsk lines. The important rail center of Luga has been captured by the Red Army, which is now about 45 miles north of Pskov, from which 6 main rail lines radiate. German troops still remaining in the Lake Ilmen salient will

SECRET

probably commence their withdrawal within the next few days. The Germans, however, again scored a defensive success in the Vitebsk sector.

The most important feature in the huge battle area south of the Pripet continues to be the encirclement of a German group of divisions in the vicinity of captured Korsun, southwest of Cherkassy. All enemy attempts to relieve these troops, estimated to be the equivalent of 6 to 10 divisions, have failed. German penetration of Russian defenses northwest of Zvenigorodka was achieved, but it remains to be seen whether this penetration will bring relief to the encircled divisions.

Whether German forces have also been encircled in the Nikopol area on the lower Dnieper continues uncertain. It now appears possible that the greater part of these units has succeeded in withdrawing westward toward the lower Bug.

There are no indications of an imminent German evacuation of the Crimea.

Air operations on the Eastern Front were likewise greatly hampered by the weather. The Soviet Air Force, however, actively opposed the German attempt to evacuate encircled troops by air.

Nikopol and German Steel Production

The Red Army's capture of Nikopol on 8 February cost Germany her only important source of manganese. However, German exploitation of the Nikopol mines, continued during the past four months at considerable military risk, has provided her with sufficient manganese stocks to permit somewhat reduced steel production to the end of 1944. Thereafter dependence on the inferior ores available to Germany and her satellites would seriously limit their production of carbon steel and alloy steels for armaments. Were

Germany to lose her current supplies of chrome from Turkey and the Balkans, her position in alloy steels would rapidly become critical.

The German communique which conceded the loss of the manganese center, as well as official broadcasts, stated that Nikopol's industrial installations had been carefully destroyed. In view of the Soviet Union's other resources of manganese, the Axis will gain no immediate or important advantage from this action. It may be noted, however, that the Germans apparently are not anticipating an early return to Nikopol.

Possible Economic Consequences of a Russo-Finnish Peace

A further weakening of the Axis position in ferro-alloys would be a major economic consequence of a separate peace between Finland and the USSR. In 1943 Finnish exports constituted approximately 60 percent of German supplies of nickel and cobalt and almost one-quarter of her molybdenum. Germany would also lose important wood products.

In the past the Germans have chartered a considerable number of Finnish merchant ships for use in northern waters, but the Finns have curtailed this service as a result of heavy losses. However, German shipping in the Baltic, including the movement of Swedish iron-ore, would be threatened by Soviet naval vessels operating from the Gulf of Finland, if not from Finnish bases. In addition to gaining naval access to the Baltic, the USSR would regain control of the Murmansk-Leningrad railway, which would for the first time permit the shipment of Lend-Lease supplies direct to Leningrad and the northern sector of the front.

On their part, the Finns would lose essential food supplies that have come to them from the Axis. The main item of 200,000 metric tons of grain could scarcely be supplied by the Soviet Union.* Sweden might spare as much as 20,000 tons

SECRET

as well as substantial amounts of potatoes and other root vegetables, but Finland will face severe food shortages unless a solution of transport problems permits the import of food-stuffs from overseas.

Lend-Lease Traffic With Vladivostok

Mid-winter stoppage of Lend-Lease cargo traffic with Vladivostok via the Sea of Okhotsk appears imminent. To date four ships have been reported icebound inside the Kuriles.

The remaining alternative is the use of Tsushima, which would require the consent of Japan. That such negotiations are underway is indicated by the Red Navy's request for U. S. "safe conduct" for Soviet ships so routed, based on an offer of information as to departures and transit. There has been no further information on the previously reported negotiations with Tokyo for use of Kunashiri or Uruppu Straits as outlets from the Sea of Okhotsk.

Northwest Pacific Area

Some increase in Japanese naval and air forces in the Kuriles area is reported. Such dispositions, however, are believed to be purely defensive. Latest estimates show 1 heavy cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 5 destroyers and 2-3 submarines in the area.

Central Pacific Area

Enemy air strength is probably being increased from the low level occasioned by losses in the Marshalls. Meanwhile, surface forces at Truk are believed to have undergone a considerable reduction over the past several weeks and it is estimated that heavy cruisers are the largest units remaining in the area.

The first enemy air reaction since our occupation of the Kwajalein Atoll took place on the night of 11-12 February, when 12 to 14 bombers employing radar jamming devices attacked our positions on Roi Island, causing some damage. It seems probable that the enemy aircraft came from Ponape, possibly staging through Kusaie. However, since reconnaissance of Ponape, Kusaie and Eniwetok have failed to reveal the presence of enemy aircraft, it is possible that the aircraft making this attack were actually based in the Truk area. Until such time as the enemy fields at Ponape, Eniwetok and Kusaie are neutralized, night bombing attacks on our Kwajalein bases remain an enemy capability.

There were no signs of air activity on the enemy-held islands in the Marshalls, although efforts have been made to keep the runways operational in spite of the almost daily bombing by our aircraft and occasional shelling by naval vessels.

South and Southwest Pacific Area

The Japanese logistic position in the Bismarcks-Solomons area continued to worsen with our occupation of the Green (Nissan) Islands. Communication between Rabaul and Bougainville is now apparently restricted to transportation by submarines, and this is believed true also of several other New Britain bases, though landing barges are still in evidence in the latter area. Intensified activity in the New Ireland-Admiralty Islands area suggests that greater emphasis is being placed on reinforcement of these bases lying to the north of New Britain. Increased shipping has been noted at Kavieng, which is becoming more prominent *vis-a-vis* Rabaul than formerly. Present indications are that the Japanese will continue to make every effort to transport essential supplies to the Bismarcks.

Air activity in this area continued the pattern of recent

SECRET

weeks. The pressure against the enemy's airfields and installations at Rabaul was maintained at a high pitch, with two or three attacks on all days that weather permitted. During a short interval of bad weather the enemy apparently succeeded in bringing in fighter replacements and on the following day heavier interception was encountered. This increased scale of interception was not maintained, however, and toward the end of the week it returned to the reduced level of the preceding week and was likewise characterized by lack of aggressiveness. While it is obvious, therefore, that the enemy is still bringing in replacements, there are indications that they are arriving with less frequency and that his strength available in the area must be conserved. There are likewise indications that the enemy is unable or unwilling to replace losses at Rabaul and at the same time build up his depleted strength in the Carolines.

The enemy's offensive air activity was again limited to light night attacks against Allied advanced bases. Following the successful Allied attack the preceding week upon Wewak, no further attempt was made to utilize the relatively heavy strength disposed along the northern coast of New Guinea. It seems likely that this strength will be held beyond the range of Allied attack, in anticipation of further Allied amphibious operations.

Meanwhile, enemy development of bases on the northern New Guinea coast continues. Two new airfields at Aitape, 80 miles NW of Wewak, and two additional fields at Hollandia are reported operational. Active development also continues in Halmahera, off the NW coast of New Guinea, and in the eastern approaches to that area. On New Britain, the Japanese air strip at Cape Hoskins is now operational and contains some planes, indicating probable Japanese efforts against our western New Britain beachheads.

Burma

In the Arakan area, where the Japanese have committed 9 and possibly 10 battalions, enemy frontal, holding and enveloping attacks continue and some successes have been scored by the enemy. For the first time they are using units of the "Indian Independence Army" in front-line fighting and therefore may be expected to make strong efforts to achieve success.

Enemy air activity in Burma continues to be confined largely to the Arakan front. Large formations of enemy fighters were sighted on four consecutive days and it appears probable that the enemy will continue to employ his air force in support of ground operations in this area.

China

Further toll was taken of enemy shipping in the Yangtze River and off the China coast during low level attacks by medium and heavy bombers of the Fourteenth Air Force. A total of 9 ships was reported sunk during the past week, ranging from a 125-foot trawler up to a 500-foot transport, and four others were damaged. On 13 February, units of the Fourteenth Air Force in a number of separate missions covered virtually the entire China coastal area from Foochow to the Gulf of Tonking.

Enemy air activity in the China theatre increased considerably during the week. Interceptions were encountered by our formations in the Hongkong area and near Kiukiang in the Yangtze Valley. The enemy also renewed his attacks upon our forward bases. These attacks may well be a response to the recent successful bombing of enemy shipping off the China coast.

Japanese air strength in Formosa continues to grow and has now reached a total of 600 aircraft.

SECRET

China's Policy Toward Puppets

Chinese commentators have recently focused attention on the problem of the treatment to be accorded Chinese serving the Japanese in occupied areas. The Kuomintang Government policy appears to be increasingly conciliatory. Dr. K. C. Wu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated publicly last November that Chinese puppets would not necessarily be regarded as war criminals. Recently the Minister of Information, Liang Han-chao, urged the exercise of caution in determining which Chinese had willingly turned traitor and which had accepted Japanese rule for "rice-bowl" reasons. On this occasion also, Wu recommended that cases against "so-called traitors" not be "pre-judged." Finally, the Chungking Catholic newspaper, *Yi Shih Pao*, on 21 January carried an editorial that went so far as to urge the arch-puppets Pu-yi (Japanese-chosen "Emperor of Manchoukuo") and Wang Ching-wei (Japanese-appointed "Premier" of Occupied Central China) to reform and render services to Free China in return for forgiveness.

Few Chinese probably would follow quite so far as *Yi Shih Pao*. Almost all groups agree that Wang Ching-wei should be punished. However, Wang Chung-hui, a confidant of the Generalissimo and Secretary General of the Supreme National Defense Council, recently stated that the case for punishing Chen Kung-po, puppet Mayor of Shanghai, was a "doubtful" one. If that should be the eventual line taken, few of the puppets would be treated severely. The whole bureaucracy of magistrates and lesser officials would presumably be forgiven as "rice-bowl" instances.

Chungking's conciliatory attitude probably has a double motive. In the first place, Chinese psychological warfare can profitably aim at increasing Japanese distrust of their puppets while preparing the Chinese in the occupied areas

for the day when they can safely turn against Japan. Secondly, the Chungking Government will find many of the individual administrators now serving the Japanese useful for establishing Chungking control over those areas. Unquestionably some of the puppets are looking forward hopefully to that day, and their local experience can be important to Free China in consolidating the position of the Kuomintang. Moreover, it is not improbable that, since some of the puppet leaders have had intimate connections with the Kuomintang in the past, some leaders of the present Chungking Government are anxious to intervene in behalf of their former associates. Since young Chinese nationalists, the Communists (who have always been militantly anti-puppet), and perhaps some of the Allied nations may not have the same view of Chungking's necessities and aims, the public statements in favor of leniency may be intended to prepare for the time when the Chungking policy would be put into operation.

Trends in Manchurian Economic Development

Manchuria, already an essential element in the Japanese war economy, has recently experienced a rapid acceleration in the development of certain key industries. The Japanese are making every effort to speed up production in the heavy industries, particularly metals and minerals, and in agriculture. There is also growing emphasis upon certain end products such as aircraft, transport vehicles and machine tools, as well as upon the expansion of synthetic oil plants and the construction of synthetic rubber factories.

These developments are intended in part to minimize the possible loss of products now derived from the southern regions. Even if Japan succeeds in retaining possession of the Outer Zone throughout 1944, the shipping stringency is likely to curtail or even cut off imports from Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

SECRET

All available evidence indicates that Japan has singled out for special attention increased production of Manchuria's iron, lead, zinc, tungsten, molybdenum, aluminum ores, synthetic fuel, and coal. The potential importance of this trend is suggested by referring to Outer Zone contributions. In 1943 Manchuria produced 25 percent of the iron available to Japan. If the southern regions were cut off this proportion would be raised to roughly 40 percent, even if Manchurian production were not increased. On the same assumption, Manchuria would supply more than 50 percent of Japan's total lead production instead of 30 percent, and 40 percent of the aluminum ores, instead of 10 percent. Manchuria's coal and shale reserves, which can be converted into synthetic oil, are particularly important. This oil would in smaller measure help satisfy Japan's requirements when the N. E. I. cease to be the basic source of the Japanese oil supply.

In addition to industrial development, agricultural expansion, particularly rice production, has been encouraged by special appropriations in Japan's 1944 budget. Two large irrigation and colonization projects on the Sungari and Liao rivers are to be completed at top speed. Farm implements will be exported from Hokkaido to Manchuria and funds to cover 50 percent of Manchuria's farming expenses have been promised by Agriculture and Commerce Minister Yamazaki in the recent Diet sessions in Tokyo.

Labor is a problem in Manchuria, not so much because of an actual labor shortage but because of Japan's coercive techniques of recruitment, severe restrictions on workers' privileges, and low wage scales. Chinese and Korean labor, fundamentally hostile to Japanese control, cannot be expected to respond well to further coercive measures which Japan may employ in the effort to drive more workers into Manchuria's industries. A "stupendous labor mobilization

SECRET

plan" has been reported, which is to go into effect some time during this year. This plan contemplates the large-scale use of women and children, and the impending transfer to factories, mines and other "vital industries" of men working on farms and boys engaged in non-essential industries.

Merchant Shipping Situation

Allied and neutral merchant shipping losses so far this month total 10 vessels of 40,200 GRT, as compared with 12 vessels of 50,750 GRT during the same period last month. Six of these vessels were lost by enemy action—1 in the Atlantic, 3 in the Mediterranean, and 2 in the Indian Ocean.

Among the week's losses was a medium-sized British tanker which sank at Seydisfjordur, eastern Iceland, as the result of near hits scored by three FW-200's. This was the first reported air attack on shipping in Icelandic waters since July, 1943.

SPECIAL ARTICLES

	Page
1. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN BURMA-----	21
2. THE FRENCH UNDERGROUND-----	23

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN BURMA

Until such time as Allied forces can secure and maintain a port of sufficient capacity on the China coast, Burma remains the key to any large scale Allied operations in China. In order that Allied air forces, as well as the Chinese divisions in Yunnan, may be adequately equipped and supplied, northern Burma must be wrested from the Japanese and securely held in Allied hands.

To the Japanese, the strategic value of Burma is two-fold. First, Burma must be denied to the Allies to prevent the opening of land communications between India and China; second, Burma must be held by the Japanese as a strong point on their defensive perimeter to protect their own positions in the Malaya-Singapore-Sumatra area.

The Japanese have been very sensitive and have reacted quickly to any Allied activity in the Southeast Asia Command Area. For example, when Allied strength began to build up in India, the Japanese countered with an increase in their own strength in Burma from four to seven divisions. At the present time, the total number of Japanese troops identified in that area is estimated to be 150,000 men, and although the general disposition of these troops is of a defensive nature, it is believed that the Japanese possess the capability to launch an offensive with the limited objective of disrupting Allied preparations in India. A few months ago on the Burma-China border the Yunnan forces deployed along Salween River seemed to constitute a threat against the Japanese eastern flank. The Japanese reaction was the prompt seizure and sealing off of all ferries, crossings and passes along the Salween River and the liquidating of all bridge-heads leading from Yunnan into Burma. This was followed by a limited objective offensive against the Chinese forces in the Kunlong area with the purpose of disorganizing any preparations that the Chinese might have been making for an offensive in that area.

The battle for Burma is essentially a battle for lines of communication. The Allied supply problem is vast and up to the present has held down advances to a snail's pace. In the Hukawng Valley the American-trained Chinese divisions have been able to move southward only as far as the road from Ledo could be completed behind them, and the building of that road itself is dependent upon the tenuous and insufficient line of communications from Calcutta to

SECRET

Assam. The Japanese, however, have the advantage of operating on interior lines of communication. They have feverishly constructed roads in south and central Burma and have opened up overland communications with Siam and with French Indochina. The latter has been accomplished by important rail as well as motor road construction. Also, the Irrawaddy River provides the Japanese with a means of easy and economical transportation into the very heart of Burma. However, in some areas the Japanese themselves are faced with serious communication difficulties. In the Hukawng Valley, for example, there is very little opportunity for troops to live off the country and there is evidence that the Japanese position in that area may be very unsatisfactory due to the fact that sufficient food and materiel cannot always reach the front-line troops.

The present operations in the Arakan Peninsula are interesting and important. They are interesting because the Japanese have again repeated the tactical operation that has until now been successful in preventing any Allied penetration into Burma; i.e., the Japanese invariably infiltrate in an attempt to cut off the communications of troops opposing them, and to create confusion in the rear areas inducing panic and forcing a withdrawal. However, at the present time, the Allied troops employed have been thoroughly trained in just this type of warfare and if these troops, which the Japanese now have cut off, react as anticipated and do not retreat, it is quite likely that the Japanese will find that it is they, themselves, who are cut off and it is they who must fight their way through or perish.

The operations are important because they will indicate the degree of success obtained in the tactical training of troops in the South East Asia Command Area and will prove or disprove the ability of these troops to match the Japanese in the art of jungle warfare. Most important of all, however, will be the political effect which the success or failure of the present campaign will have on the peoples of India, Burma, China, and Siam. If the campaign is successful, the Allied political position will be greatly strengthened in addition to the military situation being made more secure. An Allied failure or retreat with its accompanying loss of face in the eyes of the Asiatics would so strengthen Japanese prestige in India and Burma that any future operations in this area might be seriously handicapped.

THE FRENCH UNDERGROUND

The armistice of June 1940 did not end French resistance; it simply drove resistance underground. Small groups throughout France made individual decisions to keep up the fight against the Germans. At first, these groups were scattered and weak, demoralized by the crushing military defeat, intimidated by German and Vichy police controls, separated by old-time political differences, and handicapped by the division of France into zones between which communication was severely restricted. Almost all were by necessity more concerned with maintaining their identity and making contact with other groups than with carrying out programs of active subversion. Yet, by the end of 1940, as many as eighty separate groups were reported in existence. From this beginning, as a result of internal unification on both the organizational and political levels, there has grown a powerful and well-organized movement of French Resistance. Its leaders believe that French Resistance is today in a position to render the United Nations vital assistance at the moment of Allied landings in France.

Movement Toward Unity

Through 1941 the better-organized of the resistance groups began to establish effective contact with each other. Toward the end of the year loose large-scale organizations appeared—*Combat*, *Liberation*, and *Franc-Tireur* in the Unoccupied Zone, *Liberation* and the *Front National* in the Occupied Zone.

The next phase of unification was accomplished to a great degree in London. The Fighting French organization offered unusual facilities both for liaison and for financial and other forms of military support; and General Charles de Gaulle symbolized the spirit and determination of French resistance. The Gaullist organization, moreover, seemed at that date to furnish the best channel for military liaison with the western democracies and thus for the coordination of underground operations with a possible invasion. For these and other reasons, the resistance movement as a whole, with some minor exceptions, moved during 1942 to recognize de Gaulle as the leader of resistance and to accept the Fighting French headquarters in London as the center of liaison.

SECRET

In the spring of 1943 further unification took place in France, to a great degree as a result of plans formulated in London. The three main organizations in the Unoccupied Zone formed the *Mouvements Unis de Resistance* (MUR) and agreed to merge their paramilitary organizations, while keeping their propaganda organs separate. One representative of each organization along with one representative of de Gaulle served on a coordinating committee. A similar framework developed in the Occupied Zone.

In May 1943 the resistance groups took the final step of setting up a National Council of Resistance, formally composed of delegates from each of eight resistance groups (three in the South Zone, five in the North Zone), two clandestine trade unions, and six political parties. The National Council aimed at the over-all coordination of the action and policies of resistance. While such complete integration has proved a practical impossibility and the Council appears to have met only about four times, it does seem to have a genuine existence inside France. In any case, the formation of the National Council has been accompanied by an acceleration of the movement toward unity on the lower levels. Local "Committees of Fighting France" are supposed to unite all groups for joint action at the moment of invasion.

The official contact between the Resistance and the French Committee of National Liberation is the Commissariat of the Interior, a post which has regularly been held by representatives of the underground (Andre Philip and Emmanuel D'Astier de la Vigerie). Other contacts are available through channels built up by Colonel Passy through the *Bureau Centrale de Renseignements de l'Armee* (BCRA) for the Fighting French in London. The underground can make its wishes known to the Committee both through statements of the National Council of Resistance and through its forty delegates to the Consultative Assembly at Algiers. It is clear that the nomination of these delegates was not directed by the Committee; their behavior in Algiers has shown at once their independence of the Committee and their sense of responsibility to their constituency in France.

The Underground and the Allies

French nationalism provides the moral mainspring of French resistance. Because of the recrudescence of nationalism, the underground's attitude toward Great Britain and the United States is complex. The Resistance began with a distinct sense of ideological

affinity with the western democracies, as well as with the obvious knowledge that Britain and America would provide the liberating armies. Yet in the years between the Armistice and the eventual invasion the underground has become increasingly critical of Anglo-American policy. The political management of the North African invasion was resented inside France, both because of the supposed adoption of Darlan, who had devoted considerable energy to destroying the underground, and because of the by-passing of de Gaulle, the supposed leader of French Resistance. The continuance of Vichy officials in the Giraud administration caused increased criticism in the underground press; and the present state of qualified Anglo-American recognition now enjoyed by the Committee at Algiers puzzles the Resistance. An additional sore point at present is the alleged reluctance of Britain and the United States to deliver adequate supplies of arms.

These criticisms, intensified by the profound fear that Britain and America no longer intend to treat France as a major power, have generated a definite mistrust of Allied intentions. The Resistance looks with alarm on the prospect of Allied interference with French internal affairs after invasion; it fears that some form of Allied military government may be imposed, in order to save Vichy collaborationists and to prevent the Resistance from carrying through the social reforms it believes necessary for the future of France. The failure to arm the Resistance, for example, is widely believed to be due to Allied fears of a new French revolution. These suspicions are characteristic expressions of the acute sensitivity now manifested by French nationalism. Grave as these suspicions are, they have not yet resulted in any basic alienation from the western Allies. The language used in the "Letters to the American People" and "Letters to President Roosevelt" which appear occasionally in the clandestine press is consistently that of one friendly nation appealing to another.

While the distrust of Anglo-American intentions has caused a tendency to look toward Moscow, and while admiration for the Red Army is widespread, there appears to be little inclination (except among Communists) to find in the success of Russian arms an argument for the adoption of Communism. Whatever advantage the USSR gained by the fuller recognition it granted the Algiers Committee it is said to have lost by its reported indifference to French interests at Moscow and Teheran. On internal issues the Resistance as a whole is democratic in its political, leftist but not Communist in its economic

SECRET

tendencies. There appears complete agreement on the principles of representative democracy, though there is considerable feeling that the executive branch should be strengthened in order to prevent a repetition of the political futilities of the Third Republic. Even the conservative wing of the clandestine press admits the principle of state control of key industries and financial institutions and of state responsibility for individual welfare; and the radical wing, while advocating state ownership of basic industries, would leave a sector free for small business and private enterprise. But these sentiments are still in the stage of affirmation rather than detailed planning.

The Underground and the People

It is generally estimated that at least ninety percent of the French people are anti-German and prepared to support the underground. Estimates of the size of the resistance movements differ radically, according to whether the Resistance is meant to include active cadres now in existence, or the manpower potential in case of invasion, or simply all those in sympathy with underground activities and receptive to its propaganda. In any case, the basic factor is not the size of the mass following, but the ability, skill, and discipline of the leaders. The Resistance draws, moreover, from virtually all social classes, though it remains true that the backbone of Resistance as a mass movement will probably come from the workers. The lower middle class—*petite bourgeoisie*—is sympathetic, both because of its republican traditions and because of its pauperization as a result of German and Vichy economic policy. The peasants, though they have received favored treatment from Vichy, are decreasingly contented and seem likely to go along. The lower ranks of the civil service, especially the teachers, are with the Resistance, as are the majority in the liberal professions and the lower ranks of the clergy. A minority of Army officers have won many positions of leadership in the Resistance, though the bulk of the military seems still suspicious of its leftist connections. Only a minority of the higher civil servants, the higher clergy, and the representatives of finance and industry have committed themselves to resistance; *attentisme* or, in many cases, outright collaboration has been their prevailing tendency.

The Resistance Groups

The actual work of sabotage and subversion is performed in the main by the so-called "pure" resistance groups. Of these, one of the

largest and, because of its heterogeneity, perhaps the most characteristic, is *Combat*. Its evolution has tended to reflect the diverse trends in organization and thought typical of the Resistance as a whole.

Combat began in 1941 as an essentially conservative movement. It was composed of two smaller resistance groups, headed by men now in Algiers as members of the Algiers Committee, Henri Frenay and Francois de Menthon. Frenay's organization was predominantly militarist in character, dedicated to the success of Petain's National Revolution, but convinced that National Revolution could come only after National Liberation. Certain high Vichy officials, especially Pucheu, encouraged this group to think that it was expressing the secret views of the Marshal himself. *Combat* was anti-Communist, even after Hitler's attack on Russia, and anti-British, even to the extent of refusing to accept aid as well as orders from across the Channel. The organization consisted in the main of Catholics. But it became increasingly evident through 1942 to the *Combat* leadership that a mass resistance movement would have to be based primarily on the working class. Accordingly an agreement was reached with the Socialist Party by which its militants could join *Combat*, which steadily took a more open stand in opposition to the principles of the National Revolution. By 1943 one-third of the members of *Combat* were estimated to be current or former Socialists. This broadening of the membership was accompanied by the decision to recognize de Gaulle as the leader of French Resistance, by a general leftward drift in ideology, and by increased cooperation with the other resistance organizations. The clandestine paper *Combat*, the organ of the movement, has a reported circulation of 60,000 each week. In addition to its vigorous propaganda effort, the movement sponsors a number of *groupes francs* engaged in industrial sabotage, destruction of specific military targets, and attacks on Germans and collaborationists. Beyond this, there are a large number of secret military formations, now united with the military arms of the other MUR groups. The paramilitary units of *Combat* were estimated in October 1942 to comprise 25,000 men.

The southern branch of *Liberation* is likewise affiliated with the MUR; unlike *Combat*, *Liberation* also exists in the North Zone. Its origins were more unmistakably leftist, and its early leaders included the Socialists Andre Philip and Pierre Vienot. On the other hand, the presence of the rightist Emmanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie would seem to indicate again the submergence of politics in the greater task of

SECRET

resistance. Within *Liberation*, again unlike *Combat*, the Socialist and trade-union elements are more clearly dominant over the "pure" resistance leaders; and *Liberation* was the first of the major underground groups to recognize the leadership of de Gaulle. Its activities, both resistance and propaganda, closely resemble those of *Combat*.

The third of the *Mouvements Unis de Resistance* is the *Franc-Tireur* organization, primarily a small propaganda organization, enjoying close connections with Radical Socialist parliamentarians.

The main Communist-dominated resistance organization is the *Front National*. Its membership includes many non-Communists, however, attracted by its program of extreme activism, and its propaganda follows the present Communist line of stressing broad objectives of democracy and national liberation.

Army officers use the *Organization Civile et Militaire* (OCM) as their main vehicle of undercover organization. The OCM maintains various contacts in high official and army circles, as well as with sympathetic business groups. Its relations with the rest of the Resistance continued distant until unification was apparently effected in December 1943. This alliance has doubtless provided the resistance guerrilla units with a greater degree of trained leadership.

Underground Labor Unions

In spite of the strength of the pre-war labor movement, and in spite also of the anti-labor and anti-trade-union program of the Vichy Government, the trade unions, as such, have not been a major factor in resistance, though individual trade unionists are the backbone of most of the resistance groups. This fact is due to the internal disunity of the French labor movement—the long-standing rivalry between the Christian and Socialist trade unions, the fight between the Socialists and Communists in the *Confederation Generale du Travail* (CGT), the split within the CGT over the tactics of resistance, and the adherence of certain trade-union leaders, Socialist as well as Catholic, to Vichy.

The main form of trade-union resistance has come to be the development of an underground labor movement, formed by reconstituting illegally the organizations dissolved by Vichy. In addition, systematic and occasionally successful attempts have been made to capture the leadership of the organizations set up under Vichy's Labor Charter. At present, the trade-union underground consists of various groups, each now crystallized around a clandestine trade-union paper, gen-

erally reflecting the diverging views of various trade-union and Socialist leaders—*La Resistance Ouvriere* of Guigui, *Action* of Gazier, *Mouvement Ouerier Francais* (MOF) of Philip. In recent months, the clandestine Bureau of the CGT has increasingly asserted its authority over its former member unions, and it has now replaced the MOF as the center of union resistance. The new CGT has, in effect, repealed the 1939 expulsion of the Communists, and Gazier rather than Guigui seems to express its present views abroad. The trade union resistance has as a whole recognized de Gaulle's leadership since 1942, while at the same time making reservations about the alleged rightist influences in his entourage.

Underground Political Parties

The rightist and center political parties in the underground National Council of Resistance have little more than a paper existence. As for the leftist parties, the Radical Socialists have accomplished little in the form of overt action since Herriot and Jeanneney protested the closing of the chamber. Their main activity appears to be occasional clandestine meetings, and even more occasional manifestos.

The Socialist Party, with its strong pacifist traditions, was somewhat demoralized by the war. Sixty Socialist deputies and senators voted for the grant of full powers to Petain in July 1940, and certain Socialist factions, especially the Neo-Socialists of Deat and Marquet and the extreme Pacifists of Paul Faure, went all the way over to Vichy. On the other hand, a large part of the rank and file, and many of the leaders, especially Andre Philip in the South Zone and Andre le Troquer in the North, began a clandestine reorganization of the Party. Leon Blum's effective defense of the Socialist record at Riom increased the Party's prestige. All collaborationists have now been officially purged. Present Socialist activity is chiefly in the realm of political propaganda and agitation. The party organ *Le Populaire* circulates widely, and the traditional Socialist program of state ownership of basic industries is pressed in the party literature. The Party retains, however, only an uncertain control over those of its militants active in the Resistance, and its main importance is likely to come after the war when the parliamentary system is once more in operation. It allows limited present cooperation with the Communists, and has accepted de Gaulle's leadership, with the usual reservations, since June 1942. Le Troquer and Philip have been active on the French Committee.

SECRET

Of the pre-war political parties, the Communists have been by far the most successful in setting up an underground organization. The energy and initiative of Communist leadership has gone far in French eyes to redeem that party from the discredit into which it fell as a result of its defeatist conduct during the war and its ambiguous relations with the Nazis for some months after the Armistice. Since 22 June 1941 Communist propaganda, as in all occupied countries, has laid vehement stress upon nationalist and democratic aims. Specifically Communist agitation is presumably being held in reserve.

The main present centers of Communist activity are Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, St. Etienne, Marseille and Clermont-Ferrand. *L'Humanite* now appears as a monthly organ of the Party in four regional editions, reportedly of 70,000 each. From the start, the Communists have urged a policy of immediate resistance upon all possible fronts, demonstrations, strikes, sabotage, and guerrilla activity. As a result, persons of all political faiths who wanted immediate and extreme action have tended to link up with Communist resistance groups. The efficiency of the Communist underground is universally admitted, but Communists have also certainly claimed credit for many deeds performed by non-Communist resistance groups.

From 1941 to 1943 the Communists worked for the unification of all resistance groups under the aegis of their *Front National*. The failure of this effort was admitted when the Party and the Front National joined the National Council of Resistance. Since November 1942 the Communists have acknowledged de Gaulle's leadership, though recently they failed to reach an agreement with de Gaulle on Communist representation in the Committee at Algiers and have engaged in criticism of some of his actions. The other resistance groups, while retaining their distrust of Communist methods and objectives, work with them in the cause of national liberation.

The Secret Army

One of the results of the establishment of the National Council of Resistance was the setting-up of a plan to coordinate all underground military groups. It has, of course, been difficult to realize this plan because of the impracticability of over-all direction of a kind of warfare so dependent on local circumstances. Nonetheless, a certain degree of liaison among the military units may now be presumed to exist.

In October 1943 there were two types of armed resistance forces. *Action Immediate* (AI) included 70,000 men reported already engaged

in anti-German operations. A considerable portion of this group were fugitives from the labor draft who had fled to the *maquis*. The maintenance of the *maquis* was a problem, not only of military organization, but even more of getting in food and clothing in sufficient quantities to keep the men alive. This second task led to "requisitions" upon the local peasantry and consequently uncertain relations with the countryside. The resistance of the *maquis*, seems, moreover, to have been predicated on action "before the leaves of autumn." When this failed to materialize and winter approached, many began to drift back to the cities. In spite of all, however, a considerable nucleus still exists in the *maquis*—perhaps 10,000 of an original 40,000–50,000.

The guerrilla band most active to date in such operations as dynamiting, train wrecking and attacks on isolated detachments appears to be the *Francs-Tireurs et Partisans* (FTP), the military arm of the *Front National*. This organization claims a present strength of about 30,000 men, and has a much greater potential force in case of invasion.

The second type of resistance force was the *Armee Secrete* (AS), 180,000 men holding themselves in reserve for the invasion. Operating in the wooded and mountainous regions of central France, guerrilla bands, if properly supplied, can seriously disrupt the communications, destroy ammunition and food reserves, and harass the morale of the enemy. Some Resistance spokesmen even envisage the possibility of isolating Marseille from Toulouse, Bordeaux from the Loire, and holding strategic points such as Vercors, Jura, Donon, and the Argonne.

The amount of aid the Secret Army can furnish the Allies after the landings will depend, however, on the amount of aid the Allies can furnish the Secret Army before the landings. The Secret Army needs arms and supplies, and it needs coordination with Allied plans, so that it can be mobilized before the Germans carry through their plans of rounding up all Frenchmen of fighting age.

French Resistance and Invasion

In last analysis, the full utilization of the French Resistance in assisting the Allied invasion will depend on a set of military decisions. If Resistance operations are coordinated with Allied plans, and if the guerrilla bands can be adequately armed and supplied, the French patriots are at least capable of causing considerable trouble behind the

SECRET

German lines. The USSR and Yugoslavia have illustrated the possibilities of guerrilla warfare. Though guerrilla armies of corresponding size could not sustain themselves in France, smaller bands could perform extremely useful jobs in connection with an advancing invasion front. French workers in key transport, communication, and administrative posts can also carry on effective disruptive activity.

But decisions bearing upon the Resistance have political as well as military implications. In the absence of utilization of the Secret Army, Allied landings would probably produce throughout France an outburst of heroic sacrifices, temporarily destructive but in large part wasted because of lack of equipment and of integration with Allied plans, and likely to be followed by bitterness and disillusion. This bitterness, observers state, would become explosive if the Resistance groups were not represented in the administration set up after liberation, and particularly if any appearance of systematic leniency were shown to collaborationists. Because the ablest and most desperate French patriots are in the Resistance, these groups would retain a strength and determination which would have great importance in the future of France.