

S E C R E T

OPERATIONAL SUBJECTS

REPORTS

Reports to the Navy Department covering technical information were made in the following forms, in order of the urgency of the information they contained:

- (a) dispatch;
- (b) Letter Report;
- (c) Technical Report.

Technical Reports were generally comprehensive and complete, carrying the incomplete information previously contained in dispatches and Letter Reports. All communications were addressed to Op-16-PT. In case of Technical reports, covering letters and copies of the reports also were sent to interested Bureaus or Agencies. Documents or equipment, of which there was only one available specimen, were sent to Op-16-PT with the request that they be transmitted to the interested Bureau of Agency. (1)

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(1) See Appendix 21.

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

Working Principle. Early in the War, an agreement was reached between the U.S. and British Commands whereby the first specimens of captured enemy equipment were to be allocated to the British. The agreement applied primarily to enemy marine mines. This principle, however, was continued throughout the war, even after the invasion of the continent, and was generalized to include first specimens of all captured enemy equipment and originals of documents.

The theory upon which the joint agreement was based was that such documents and equipment could be studied more quickly in the U.K. than in the U.S. for operational use in the war against Germany. While this principle was logical at the time the agreement was made, after the invasion and collapse of Germany it operated to the definite disadvantage of the United States.

Documents. (1) For handling captured enemy naval documents, a Document Center was established in the Admiralty by agreement between the Admiralty and ComNavEu. At this center the U.S. Navy was represented by a group of U.S. Naval officers qualified in the analysis of enemy documents. Microfilm copies of unique documents were made for the U.S. Navy.

In theory, all captured enemy naval documents pass through this center. In practice, however, Mission officers sometimes brought duplicate copies of documents to Paris for use in writing reports and for transmittal on to Washington. Occasionally, documents of which only one copy of each had been found, were brought to Paris for microfilming before being sent to the Admiralty Document Center. This was done under agreement with the British.

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(1) See Appendix 23.

SECRET

After V-E Day, there no longer was an operational use in Europe for captured documents. Accordingly, on 14 May 1945 at a meeting in London attended by the Chief of Mission, officers from ComNavEu, and the Admiralty, it was agreed that if any captured document would aid in the prosecution of the war against Japan, the original should go directly to the United States and a copy be given to the British.

Equipment. By joint agreement of the High Commands, first specimens of enemy equipment captured by U.S. forces were turned over to the British. In the case of a unique specimen, U.S. - British consultation sometimes was held to determine its disposition, although the British were not required to do this under the directives.

No clearing center ever was set up for captured equipment, as was done in the case of documents. After a British-found specimen had been ear-marked or removed, duplicates frequently were shipped in quantity to the United States.

Late in May 1945, ComNavEu attempted to get the British to agree to release the first specimens to the United States on the grounds that henceforth German equipment had operational value only in connection with the Japanese war. The British replied that they felt a modification of the principle was unnecessary but that individual cases should be decided as each arose.

Implementing Agreements. A Combined Air Documents Research Center (CADRC) was established early in June 1945 for the purpose of handling enemy air documents. NavTechMisEu's Air Section was a party to this arrangement.

SECRET

For allocation of captured enemy electronics equipment a Committee on Captured Enemy Electronics Equipment (COCEEE) was formed in London in the summer of 1944. NavTechIsEU's Electronics Section was a member of this Committee.

Conclusions. Mission Officers felt that the SECRET directive according the first document or specimen of equipment to the British worked unduly to the disadvantage of the U.S. Navy, particularly after V-E day, for the following reasons:

- (a) in some fields, U.S. research and testing facilities were superior to those in Britain;
- (b) some documents and equipment were of operational value in the war against Japan -- exclusively so after V-E day -- and the U.S. Navy was carrying the burden of the naval war against Japan.

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### INTERROGATION CENTERS

Frequently, the interrogation of German scientists, technicians and prisoners of war at the targets was not sufficiently exhaustive for Mission purposes. For further interrogation of such persons, the facilities of several establishments were available to, and used by, the Mission.

London. Several Germans of interest to both the Mission and British authorities were taken to facilities in London for interrogation by U.S. and British officers.

DIC at Revin. The U.S. Army established a Detailed Interrogation Center at Revin, France, in late 1944, primarily for the interrogation of military prisoners. Mission officers and technicians conducted several interrogations there. This DIC moved to Bad Schwalbach, Germany, in the summer of 1945.

"Backporch". An interrogation center, with code name "Backporch", was established near Paris by the U.S. Army on 1 August 1945 for enemy civilian scientists and technicians. NavTecMisEu was allotted space at this center for eight such persons. Individuals brought to "Backporch" by U.S. agencies other than the Mission were available to the Mission as well.

Other Interrogation Centers. Several additional interrogation centers were established by the U.S. Army in Germany, France and Luxembourg for various categories of detained enemy personnel, and were available to the Mission for interrogation purposes.

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RUSSIAN-OCCUPIED GERMANY

NavTecMisEu and other U.S. and British investigating agencies attempted to gain permission to visit known intelligence targets in Russian-Occupied Germany, but the Russians successfully blocked these attempts. Three projects for visits within the Russian zone failed to materialize:

- (a) a team was organized in the Spring to visit Gdynia, on reports of torpedo information there;
- (b) a team was organized for Danzig, to investigate submarine targets;
- (c) CIOS wished to send teams, on which NavTecMisEu would have been represented, to investigate some 30 targets in the Russian zone.

Negotiations for these projects were carried on at a high level but without success.

However, in the jointly-occupied cities of Berlin and Vienna, Mission teams finally were able to investigate targets, even those in the Russian-occupied sections of the cities. These targets were only moderately productive.

NavTecMisEu officers on the Joint Ships Inspection Party visited Russian-occupied Baltic ports in Germany, but their duties were confined strictly to the work at hand; namely, that of assessing the German fleet.

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INVESTIGATIONS IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES.

NavTecMisEu officers pursued investigations on a limited scale in neutral Switzerland and Sweden. These trips fell into two categories:

- (a) running down leads on German intelligence in these countries;
- (b) special requests from the Navy Department to study technical projects of purely Swiss or Swedish character; such investigations were not covered by the Mission's terms of reference, but were undertaken upon Washington's request, as the Mission was the organization on the spot most competent to do the work.

The same policy was followed in those countries of our Allies which had been occupied -- France, Belgium, Holland and Norway.

Visits of Mission officers to Sweden and Switzerland were held to a minimum.



S E C R E T

CASUALTIES.

The Mission suffered no combat casualties, although many officers were under fire. Officers and civilian technicians were cautioned by the Mission not to expose themselves needlessly to enemy fire, on the dual theory that the Mission was not a combat organization and that a live investigator was worth more to his country than a dead one.

Two Officers and five Petty Officers were killed in airplane and motor accidents. Four Officers, one Petty Officer, two seamen, and one civilian technician were injured in accidents. (1)

(1) See Casualty List, Appendix 25.

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PERSONNEL

Officers and civilian technicians ordered to the Mission by the Bureaus were classified under three categories:

- Category 1 -- specialists requested by the Mission for staff or specific assignment;
- Category 2 -- specialists in a particular field not currently covered by the Mission and available to the Bureaus for special assignment.
- Category 3 -- technically qualified individuals from the Bureaus or from industry whose professional association with the Bureaus was such that a visit by them to areas available to the Mission would be in the interest of the Bureaus.