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RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

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SHAFF
COMNAVEU
COMNAVFORFRANCE
COMNAVGRORFRANCE
COMNAVFORGER

The question of the Mission's relations with SHAFF and with various U. S. Naval Commands in the Theater was one, which, if mishandled, could have hampered seriously the Mission's activities.

By NavTechMiseu Directive, the Chief of the Mission was "to be regarded as the direct representative of the Commander in chief, United States Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations" and "should be given the maximum freedom of action consistent with operational Naval and Military requirements." Preservation of this relative independence of action under the Directive, while operating within other Army and Navy Command areas posed delicate problems.

It was realized at the beginning that the Mission would risk an awkward situation if the Chief of the Mission were to report directly to SHAFF, the Supreme Command Headquarters in the Theater, for this would place the Mission directly under SHAFF's naval representative, ANCXF. ANCXF was predominately a British-staffed organization, although it contained U.S. representation.

To avoid this potential embarrassment, the Mission's Directive was so worded as always to place a local U.S. naval command between SHAFF and the Mission. Paragraph 6 of the Directive stated:

"As a U.S. Naval Organization in Europe, the Naval Technical Mission will be subject to the Military control and orders of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. The Chief of the Mission, as commanding officer, will report to the Commander, Naval Forces, Europe in person."

The Directive stated further:

"The Chief of the Mission will be further directed to report to the senior U.S. Naval authority in the areas to be exploited."

The Mission's relations with the various Naval Commands, then, may be summarized as follows:

- (a) under the operational command of the Chief of Naval Operations;
- (b) under ComNavEu for administrative purposes;
- (c) to report to the senior U.S. Naval authority in the area to be exploited.

Fortunately, the few misunderstandings which arose in connection with NavTecMisEu's relations with other Commands were quickly straightened out without difficulty. The Mission was able to preserve its relative independence of action throughout.

Logistic Support. Paragraph 5 of the Mission's Directive stated:

"Existing naval activities in Europe will furnish the Mission necessary assistance in the form of transportation, billeting, office space, provisions of junior administrative personnel, clerical assistance, etc."

Thus:

- (a) ComNavEu provided the Mission with transportation and various supply items;
- (b) ComNavForFrance provided office space in Paris, billeting for officers and civilian technicians (in the Hotel Royal Monceau) and enlisted men, in Paris, and various supply items;
- (c) ComNavGroFrance, same as ComNavForFrance, which it succeeded;
- (d) ComNavForGer staffed the Mission's three forward headquarters in Germany; NavTecMisEu assigned a liaison officer to ComNavForGer;
- (e) All of the above commands contributed personnel to the Mission, particularly enlisted men.

NAVAL TARGET SUB-DIVISION (NTS)

The Naval Target Sub-Division of G-2 SHAFF was officially established 22 March 1945 by SHAFF G-2 Memorandum No. 29.(1). Actually, NTS was in operation from about 20 February 1945.

Functions. NTS functions can be summarized as follows:

- (a) to co-ordinate activities of field investigations teams exploiting naval targets;
- (b) integrate information from all sources on naval targets, for use of naval field teams;
- (c) arrange Army clearance for target exploitation teams;
- (d) maintain a situation plot showing location of all field teams;
- (e) keep a current record of all field personnel and their qualifications;
- (f) maintain target index, recording visits to targets and results obtained;
- (g) inform field teams of current directives on handling captured enemy equipment, documents, and reports;
- (h) maintain a field radio communications network;
- (i) advise all naval intelligence interests and requirements concerning:
 - 1. technical and scientific investigations;
 - 2. prisoner of war interrogations;
 - 3. captured enemy naval documents;
 - 4. CIOB field team operations (naval);
 - 5. requests for special equipment.

Background. Throughout the summer and fall of 1944, several U.S. and British naval intelligence-gathering agencies operated in France independently of each other. As time went on, experience demonstrated the desirability of co-ordinating their various efforts, particularly in view of the impending collapse of Germany with a resultant opening up of the entire German intelligence field.

(1) See Appendix 14.

Means of achieving this co-ordination were discussed in London between ComNavEu and the Admiralty in December, 1944 and January, 1945. ComNavEu drew up proposals for a co-ordinating agency, to which the Admiralty made counter-proposals. It was at this stage that NavTechIsEu entered the negotiations, upon the Chief of Mission's return from Washington in January. He immediately agreed in principle to the establishment of such a co-ordinating agency.

Further negotiations followed between representatives of NavTechIsEu, ComNavEu, ComNavForFrance, SHAFF, and ANICF (British officers of ANICF presented Admiralty's views) resulting in the agreement as published in SHAFF G-2 Memorandum of 22 March 1945. (1)

Throughout the negotiations, the Chief of Mission was successful in his careful efforts to preserve the freedom of action he considered necessary for the carrying out of the Mission's Directive.

Among other things, he insisted:

- (a) that NTS be an organization to serve, rather than direct, member agencies;
- (b) that NavTechIsEu retain the right to duplicate other agencies' investigation of any target if the Mission felt that such a duplication would be useful.

The Chief of Mission maintained that "the philosophy of operation of NavTechIsEu should be that it be given the maximum opportunity of fulfilling its mission within a framework of limitations designed ONLY to prevent it from interfering in any way with the prosecution of the war in the European Theater." ((2))

(1) See Appendix 14.

(2) See Appendix 11 for further arguments of the Chief of Mission supporting these points.

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Organization. NTS was organized under the Special Sections Sub-Division, G-2 SHAFF, with offices at Versailles, France, later at Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany.

A Royal Navy Captain, Intelligence Officer for SHAFF, was designated Head of NTS, with NavTechIsEu Commander as Deputy and acting Head. NavTechIsEu's officer was finally withdrawn from his full-time duties with NTS on 22 July 1945, upon dissolution of SHAFF. The several other officers employed were drawn half from the British and half from the U.S. Navy.

Communications. NTS operated a field radio network comprising 16 field teams, two sub-headquarters at SHAFF. This latter was British-manned. Ten of the field teams were British, six were U.S. (provided by ComNavForFrance). (1) The field teams were equipped with SCR-399 radio trucks. They were scattered strategically throughout the occupied area, setting up usually with army communication units. They were moved according to the shifting needs of field teams who were kept informed of the stations' locations. NTS communication teams operated from 28 February to 30 May 1945. During its peak period the communication system handled as many as 50 messages a day. On one occasion for a period of several days the NTS network was the only communication system available to one army echelon.

Field teams used the radio network to report their movements, findings, requests, etc., back to their respective headquarters.

Clearences. The most complex problem handled by NTS was that of obtaining clearances for field teams to operate in the various army command areas. Local army commands sometimes were unusually jealous of their prerogatives in controlling intelligence exploitation within their territories.

- (1) The six U.S. Teams comprised two officers and 55 men.
U.S. teams operated in 29 different locations.

Occasionally teams were required to clear through echelons as low as Division. Frequently the tactical situation caused legitimate restrictions to be placed on movements of intelligence gathering teams. For example, during the critical days of the German break-through below Liege in December 1944--January 1945, no field intelligence teams were allowed to proceed to this area.

The problem of clearances was complicated by the fact that areas controlled by various army units constantly were shifting. Furthermore, policy of the army commanders in the matter of clearances varied with the command. T-Forces ameliorated clearance difficulties somewhat.

The routine for obtaining clearances was through the army chain of command -- from agency to NTS to SHAFF to Army Group to that Army whose area was to be visited; and back again. This usually required several days. NTS -- and member agencies -- never ceased their efforts to speed up the process. (1)

Co-Ordination of Information and Exploitation. Incoming target assessment information and technical intelligence received from many sources were studied to insure that both the British and U.S. Navy Intelligence Teams were informed. In many cases combined intelligence exploitation teams were arranged.

Target Assessment Files. An excellent card file of technical intelligence targets was maintained in geographical order. On these cards notations were made as to the value of the target, as indicated by assessment reports received from the many sources at SHAFF. These cards were maintained up to date throughout the spring and summer of 1945. They eventually were recognized as the most complete target evaluation file in the Theater.

(1) In this connection see:

- a) Appendix 16.
- b) Appendix 15.

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Conclusion. NTS was extremely useful to NavTechisFu. It had shortcomings, to be expected in any organizations improvised to meet an urgent need. But it accomplished its fundamental purpose of co-ordinating the work of Naval investigation agencies. In so doing, it spared all member agencies a great deal of confusion.

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COMBINED INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES SUB-COMMITTEE (CIOS)

CIOS was created by a directive to the Combined Chief's of Staff. As an advisory body to SHAEP, it undertook to co-ordinate all technical intelligence activities in the European Theater, both U.S. and British. The U.S. Navy was one of its 14 members. CIOS operated from London. It compiled target and personality lists on a priority basis for guidance of exploitation teams. It organized Consolidated Advance Field Teams (CAFT) for quick assessment of targets, and sent its own teams from London to the Continent for detailed exploitation of targets.

NavTechIsEu's relations with CIOS were as follows:

- (a) NavTechIsEu, through the U.S. Navy member, was represented on CIOS;
- (b) NavTechIsEu provided 36 officers and civilian technicians to CAFT teams;
- (c) A NavTechIsEu officer was co-chairman of the CIOS Naval Group (Group 6) and such was a member of CIOS secretariat;
- (d) NavTechIsEu sometimes sent officers and civilian technicians to CIOS field teams for joint exploitation of certain targets;
- (e) Both CIOS and NavTechIsEu operated in the field through MTS;
- (f) Full exchange of information.

CIOS field teams, for the most part, were large, slow moving and unwieldy. They were dependent on SHAEP for transportation. The mission found, by experience, that its teams worked more expeditiously alone than when attached to CIOS teams. Accordingly the mission attached personnel to CIOS teams only when it was expedient to do so.

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CONSOLIDATED ADVANCE FIELD TEAMS (CAFT)

Organization. Consolidated Advanced Field Teams (CAFT) were organized by CIOS, with personnel from CIOS member agencies, to make a quick assessment of priority intelligence targets in the event of a general collapse of the German armies.

CIOS recognized that its routine procedure for forming field teams was "not adequate for conditions of rapid advance." (1) So it rearranged its target priority list of 50 types of technical interest into seven groups each encompassing related items and organized CAFT teams for each group. A NavTechisEu officer was co-chairman of the Naval Group. A CAFT team representing each target group was assigned to the three (21, 12, and 6) Army Groups on the Western Front. Seven additional teams were formed for possible airborne operations to Kiel and Berlin, and to certain targets in Russian occupied territory. These latter operations never materialized. Altogether, the CAFT plan called for 283 officers and technicians, of whom NavTechisEu provided 36.

NavTechisEu Participation. NavTechisEu's reasons for cooperating in the CAFT undertaking were:

- (a) NavTechisEu did not dispose sufficient personnel to alone cover its target list quickly enough in the event of a German collapse;
- (b) To further the policy of co-operation with the other information-gathering agencies in the field;
- (c) To avoid needless duplication of effort;
- (e) It provided a means whereby NavTechisEu personnel could be the first ones to enter targets.

Operations. CAFT teams began operation in March 1945, when Allied forces began their drive into Germany east of the Rhine.

(1) See Appendix 12.

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They sent back to NTS their reports on targets by letter, telephone and dispatch, using the NTS and army communications network. After V-E Day the importance of CAFT operations diminished. Accordingly, NavTechIsEu in agreement with CIOS Secretariat, withdrew its personnel from CAFT as of 20 May 1945.

Results. Some of the Major difficulties encountered by CAFT were:

- (a) shortages of transportation;
- (b) uncertain communications;
- (c) occasional confusion in the question of army clearances for targets;
- (d) tendency on the part of CAFT members to assess a target from the point of view of their particular interests, neglecting other technical interests.

Despite these shortages and handicaps, however, it may be said that CAFT operations were useful to NavTechIsEu.

T-FORCE

T (for Target) Forces were created by a SHAEF Directive in all Army Groups on the Western Front as service organization for all long-range intelligence gathering agencies in the field.

T-Force functions could be summarized as follows:

- (a) occupy and guard intelligence targets immediately after those targets were captured by combat troops;
- (b) billet and feed intelligence investigators at or near the target locality;
- (c) maintain an index of targets being exploited in the area with street or other addresses;
- (d) require all intelligence teams to submit brief exploitation reports after visiting targets, for the information of other teams interested in the same targets;
- (e) provide escort and guard troops for intelligence teams wherever required;
- (f) ship to proper authorities captured documents and enemy equipment, after checking same for possible operational interest of value to the Army;
- (g) provide limited transportation facilities;
- (h) provide motor pool facilities, including oil and gasoline dumps, for intelligence team vehicles;
- (i) provide communications.

T-Forces served, generally speaking, as SHAEF's agent to deal with intelligence-gathering organizations such as NavTechIntSec in the field. A T-Force thus acted as middle-man between intelligence gathering agencies and the local commands. In an area where a T-Force was operating, a T-Force pass usually was sufficient authorization to work freely in that area regardless of what Army, Corps, or Division was in control.

T-Force comprised a permanent staff of officers and a number of combat units detached from their regular duties for T-Force work. T-Forces were elastic in their size and organization.

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They were highly mobile and therefore able to move quickly from place to place, as fruitful fields of intelligence were captured and opened up for exploitation.

T-Forces were equipped to fight for targets in emergencies.

After V-E Day, Army commands established a number of semi-permanent camps, scattered strategically throughout Western and Central Germany, to supplement T-Forces in accomodating intelligence personnel in the field. At such camps, billets, mess, target lists, transportation, and clearances were available.

T-Forces operated in the British, as well as U.S. areas. However, some special naval targets in the British area were occupied by 30 Assault (later Advance) Unit, a British Naval and Marine organization.

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ALSOS MISSION

ALSOS Mission was established by the U.S. Army for the purpose of investigating secret scientific developments of the enemy. A Naval section was formed upon invitation of the Army. NavTechIsEu's Chief of Mission continued to serve as Senior Naval Member (1) of the ALSOS Mission even after NavTechIsEu was established and after the officers comprising Navy ALSOS had been transferred to NavTechIsEu. The two organizations exchanged information and sometimes made joint field investigations.

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(1) See Appendix 2.

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ADMIRALTY.

NavTechIsEu had relations indirectly with the Admiralty through a number of organizations, such as NTS and CIOB, and through contact in the field with the Admiralty's 30 Assault (later Advance) Unit. Formal contact generally was made through ComNavFu.

30 AU was an intelligence gathering organization whose purpose roughly paralleled that of NavTechIsEu. It comprised Naval Intelligence Officers and a force of Royal Marines equipped to fight for intelligence targets if need arose.

NavTechIsEu and 30 AU kept each other advised of targets they were investigating and exchanged information in general through NTS. In the field, representatives of the Mission and 30 AU frequently extended to each other the courtesy of their messing and billeting facilities. At times they jointly exploited targets.

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FIELD INFORMATION AGENCY, TECHNICAL (FIAT)

Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT) was established 31 May 1945 under G-2 SHAFF for the principal purpose of aiding U.S. and British civilian agencies to exploit German economic, industrial and technological sources. (1) Upon dissolution of SHAFF, the U.S. section of FIAT was transferred to U.S. Group Control Council, and the British wing to the Major General, Intelligence, Control Commission for Germany (British Element).

NavTecMisEu's liaison officer with FIAT constituted the Naval Section. NavTecMisEu used FIAT as a channel for obtaining release of enemy equipment in the British and French occupied zones.

(1) Appendix 17, for directive establishing FIAT, see also Appendix 18 and ComNavEu Intelligence Report X-2275, dated 7 September 1945, for status report on FIAT.