

U. S. NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION TO JAPAN
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

TMI
SRT
S-94(N)
copy 3

15 December 1945

RESTRICTED

From: Chief, Naval Technical Mission to Japan.
To : Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Target Report - Japanese Evaluation of U.S. Anti-Submarine Harbor Defenses.
References: (a) "Intelligence Targets Japan" (DNI) of 4 Sept. 1945.

1. Subject report, covering Target S-94(N) of Fascicle S-1 of reference (a), is submitted herewith.
2. The report was prepared by Capt. P. Harrison, USNR, and Lt. Comdr. J.E. Miller, USN, with the assistance of Lt.(jg) S.E. Sprague, USNR, interpreter and translator.



C. G. GRIMES
Captain, USN

33499

RESTRICTED

S-94(N)

**JAPANESE EVALUATION OF
U.S. ANTI-SUBMARINE HARBOR DEFENSES**

**"INTELLIGENCE TARGETS JAPAN" (DNI) OF 4 SEPT. 1945
FASCICLE S-1, TARGET S-94(N)**

DECEMBER 1945

U.S. NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION TO JAPAN

SUMMARY

SHIP AND RELATED TARGETS

JAPANESE EVALUATION OF U.S. ANTI-SUBMARINE HARBOR DEFENSES

There was no attempt by the Japanese to assemble and promulgate information on U. S. Anti-Submarine Harbor Defenses; hence there was no doctrine in use, the problem of attacking ships in our harbors being left to the ingenuity of the individual submarine commanders, aided in a few cases by specific information culled from air reconnaissance photographs. An amphibious tank for carrying torpedoes over our nets was developed toward the end of the war but did not see service.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary	Page 1
References	Page 3
Introduction	Page 5
The Report	Page 7

REFERENCES


Japanese Personnel Interviewed:

Commander Yahachi TANABE, IJN - Student officer at Submarine School from June until 31 October, 1941. In November, 1941, he took command of RO-59, a training submarine at the submarine school. On 31 January, 1942, he took command of I-168 under the Sixth Fleet. On 5 August, 1942, he became commanding officer of I-176. On 8 April, 1943, he was hospitalized for wounds, at YOKOSUKA Naval Hospital. On 10 August, 1943, he was assigned to duty at the Submarine School at OTAKE. On 16 June, 1945, he was assigned to duty in the Navy Ministry.

Commander Yasuo FUJIMORI, IJN - Class of 1928, Japanese Naval Academy. He assumed command of RO-60 in June, 1941. He was in command of I-121 from January to November, 1942. From November, 1942 until May, 1943, he was a student in the "A" Class at the Naval War College. In June he was assigned to the Naval General Staff, where he remained until the end of the war. At the commencement of hostilities he was in command of RO-60 stationed at KWAJALEIN as a part of a force assigned to defend the Marshall Islands.


Lt. Comdr. Totsuo TSUKUDO, IJN - Class of 1936, Japanese Naval Academy. He went to the Submarine School at KURE in January, 1941, and graduated in April, 1941. His tours of duty in the submarine service were as follows:

April, 1941, to I-7 (2000 tons) as navigator.
October, 1941, to I-25 as executive officer and torpedo officer.
July, 1942, to I-36 as torpedo officer.
October, 1942, to Submarine School as instructor.
May, 1943, to RO-62 as commanding officer.
March, 1944, to Submarine School as instructor, and remained there until the end of the war.



INTRODUCTION

This report covers the appraisal by the Japanese of United States anti-submarine harbor defenses. The report is a product of interrogation of several submarine officers who had duty as commanding officers of submarines, and also had duty in the Navy Department, in the Submarine Section.



THE REPORT

The Navy Ministry never issued any documents or specific instructions on the subjects of U.S. anti-submarine defenses. No tactical doctrines existed, and it was entirely up to the initiative of the individual submarine commanders as to their methods of operation in waters where mines and A/S nets and booms might exist. The only records kept were extracts from the reconnaissance reports of aircraft. These extracts were kept on file at the Naval General Staff Headquarters, but no written instructions or doctrines were ever issued. Aircraft reports and photographs were culled over in the Navy Department, and whatever information was pertinent was radioed to Commander Sixth Fleet.

The Japanese estimated that all our important harbors were protected by A/S defenses, such as nets, booms and mines laid at various depths, but no detailed information was ever obtained covering type or detailed construction of our equipment. It was expected that we would have mines in shallow water; so submarine commanders avoided shallow areas.

When submarine commanders were on patrol off various harbors, they attempted to estimate the position of our A/S defenses by observing the courses steered by our ships entering and leaving. Submarine commanders never made written reports covering this particular subject after they returned from patrols. Information on what had been observed by other officers got around by oral discussion.

During the first few months of the war, the submarines I-17, I-25 and I-26 operated off Puget Sound, the mouth of the Columbia River, and San Pedro respectively. None of them went in close enough to observe any nets, although the I-25 spent December 24, 25 and 26 in Monterey Bay. No instructions or doctrines were even issued to these submarines pertaining to our A/S defenses, as no information was available. Submarine commanders had considerable knowledge of the type of mine which the United States was using, but no information as to where our minefields were. On December 20 and 21 of 1941, the I-25 approached to less than ten miles of the mouth of the Columbia River and sank a 7000-ton tanker, but saw no indication of nets and booms. They anticipated that minefields might be anywhere along the coast where the water was less than 100 meters.

Rather than placing emphasis on devising methods to penetrate completed A/S harbor defenses on which they had little detailed information, the Japanese apparently decided to make attacks with human torpedoes on harbors where our defenses were weak or incomplete. Air reconnaissance by flying boats based on TRUK and elsewhere, interpretation of aerial photographs of our harbors, and submarine reconnaissance provided them with information on which to base their attacks.

Their flying boats scouted such places as ULITHI, GUAM and MAJURO for information on shipping and harbor defenses. Prior to the completion of the net at ULITHI, the Japanese estimated that at least five carriers and two damaged battleships were in ULITHI Harbor. Accordingly, they made two suicide attacks, using one-man human torpedoes. In the first attack, about the middle of November, 1944, six human torpedoes were launched from two submarines. The Japanese estimated that four warships were sunk as a result of this attack. The second attack was carried out in January, 1945. A third suicide torpedo attack on ULITHI was planned, but it was called off because of the completion of our A/S net. The Japanese were greatly surprised that we were able to complete the net at ULITHI in only one month, since they had expected the job to

require at least three months. From air reconnaissance and photographs, they knew we had completed nets with a channel just to the north of a small island at the entrance. They estimated the length of the net to be about 10,000 meters.

Neither the commander of the Sixth Fleet nor the authorities at the Submarine School ever had any more information about United States A/S defenses than was obtained by aerial reconnaissance.

Relying on aerial photographs of APRA Harbor, the Japanese thought we had no nets or booms there in January, 1945. They planned a suicide torpedo attack which was carried out that month, about the same time as the second attack on ULITHI. The Japanese submarine approached to within about three miles of APRA Harbor while it was still light, and reconnoitered. It then retired to a position about ten miles off the harbor entrance and launched four human torpedoes, at about 0300. Targets were a small carrier and a probable seaplane tender which they had spotted previously. The submarine commander observed several big explosions (flame and smoke), but it was not known which ships were hit. Later reconnaissance gave them no information.

The Japanese completed their first human torpedoes in September, 1944, and finished training of crews in October. By that time, they knew from air reconnaissance that we were using ULITHI instead of MAJURO as a base. Accordingly, no attacks were made on MAJURO.

The Japanese Army and Navy were at work on a special amphibious tank (Tokugata Sensha) which was still in the experimental stage when the war ended. Fifty tanks had actually been constructed, and experimental tests were being conducted at TATEYAMA. The method of operation was planned as follows:

One submarine was to carry two amphibious tanks, and each tank was to carry two torpedoes with a 400 kg. explosive charge. If nets and booms were found to be guarding a harbor entrance, the submarine was to maneuver to a position from which the tanks could be launched and make their way ashore. They were then to go overland, get into the harbor from the land side, and launch their torpedoes.

The Japanese considered that such an operation would be particularly effective on atolls, but they thought it could be done almost anywhere by going along the shore or even overland through rougher terrain. Reports written from memory on specifications of the tanks have been submitted by the Japanese to the U. S. Army.

The files containing aircraft reconnaissance reports and photographs of U. S. harbors were all destroyed by fire.